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A B S T R A C T
The broad construct of impulsivity is one that spans both personality and cognitive ability. Despite a common
overarching construct, previous research has found no relationship between self-report measures of impulsivity
and people's ability to inhibit pre-potent responses. Here, we use evidence accumulation models of choice re-
action time tasks to extract a measure of “response caution” (boundary separation) and examine whether this
correlates with self-reported impulsivity as measured by the UPPS-P questionnaire. Response caution reflects
whether an individual makes decisions based on more (favouring accuracy) or less (favouring speed) evidence.
We reasoned that this strategic dimension of behaviour is conceptually closer to the tendencies that self-report
impulsivity measures probe than what is traditional measured by inhibition tasks. In a meta-analysis of five
datasets (total N = 296), encompassing 19 correlations per subscale, we observe no evidence that response
caution correlates with self-reported impulsivity. Average correlations between response caution and UPPS-P
subscales ranged from rho = −0.02 to −0.04. While the construct of response caution has demonstrated value
in understanding individual differences in cognition, brain functioning and aging; the factors underlying what
has been called “impulsive information processing” appear to be distinct from the concept of impulsivity derived
from self-report.
1. Introduction
The constructs of impulsivity and self-control play a prominent role
in our current understanding of personality and neuropsychological
disorders (Chambers, Garavan, & Bellgrove, 2009; Eysenck & Eysenck,
1985; Whiteside & Lynam, 2001). However, research into the definition
and measurement of impulsivity continues to raise questions about
whether the wide range of tasks and measures that are used do in fact
measure some common underlying construct. Though different taxo-
nomies of impulsivity exist, one fundamental distinction is that per-
formance in behavioural tasks often shows little to no relationship with
self-report measures (Creswell, Wright, Flory, Skrzynski, & Manuck,
2019; Cyders & Coskunpinar, 2011, 2012; Eisenberg et al., 2019;
Sharma, Markon, & Clark, 2014). Here, we try to bridge the gap using a
cognitive model to isolate a dimension of cognition characterised as
“impulsive information processing” (Metin et al., 2013), “decision ur-
gency” or “response caution” (Evans, Rae, Bushmakin, Rubin, & Brown,
2017; Hedge, Powell, Bompas, Vivian-Griffiths, & Sumner, 2018).
One proposed reason for the discrepancy between questionnaires
and behavioural tasks is that they were developed with different goals
in mind. Cyders and Coskunpinar (2011) suggest that self-report
measures focus on general tendencies or traits while lab-based tasks
focus on “snapshots” of behaviour, which may be more sensitive to
fluctuations in states (see also Wennerhold & Friese, 2020). For ex-
ample, the UPPS-P impulsivity questionnaire consists of five subscales
labelled negative urgency, positive urgency, (lack of) premeditation,
(lack of) perseverance and sensation-seeking (Lynam, Smith, Whiteside,
& Cyders, 2006). Individuals rate the extent of their agreement with
statements about their general behaviour, such as “I am a cautious
person”, an item in the premeditation subscale.
In contrast, behavioural impulsivity tasks are sometimes broadly
categorised as either impulsive choice or impulsive action (Weafer & de
Wit, 2014). Impulsive choice tasks typically consist of delayed gratifi-
cation or gambling tasks, where individuals decide between uncertain
or delayed large rewards and certain or immediate lower value rewards.
Impulsive action typically refers to tasks designed to measure an in-
dividual's ability to rapidly inhibit a response to a salient or pre-potent
stimulus (repeatedly). For example, in the Stroop task (Stroop, 1935)
participants must quickly and accurately classify the font colour of a
word while ignoring its meaning. Performance is traditionally mea-
sured by subtracting reaction times or error rates in a congruent or
baseline condition (the word ‘red’ in red font) from an incongruent or
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conflict condition (the word ‘red’ in blue font). The subsequent RT cost
or error cost is taken as an index of an individual's ability to overcome
conflicting information. Further subcategories of inhibition tasks have
also been proposed (Friedman & Miyake, 2004; Sharma et al., 2014),
though these are not consistently supported by data (Rey-Mermet,
Gade, & Oberauer, 2018). Note that the subtraction of performance in a
baseline condition is often done for the explicit purposes of removing
individual differences in confounding factors such as strategy or caution
(Donders, 1969; though recent reviews have highlighted problems with
this assumptions; Draheim, Mashburn, Martin, & Engle, 2019; Hedge,
Powell, Bompas, et al., 2018).
This conceptual distinction between the ability to overcome conflict
and the general tendencies for cautious or impulsive behaviours may
explain why low correlations are observed between inhibition tasks and
self-report measures. We therefore reasoned that correlations might be
uncovered if we could extract a measure of ‘caution’ from cognitive
tasks. In our recent work, we have used evidence accumulation models
to better understand individual differences in choice reaction time
tasks, and conflict tasks in particular (Hedge, Powell, Bompas, et al.,
2018; Hedge, Powell, & Sumner, 2018a; Hedge, Vivian-Griffiths,
Powell, Bompas, & Sumner, 2019). The evidence accumulation frame-
work represents a broad family of models that assume that the decision
process can be represented by a process of sampling evidence from the
stimulus until a boundary or threshold has been reached (see Fig. 1; for
reviews see Donkin, Brown, Heathcote, & Wagenmakers, 2011;
Forstmann, Ratcliff, & Wagenmakers, 2016; Ratcliff & Smith, 2004).
These models can be used to dissociate and quantify the multiple pro-
cesses that contribute to behaviour.
For our current purposes, we are particularly interested in the
boundary separation parameter, sometimes referred to as “response
caution”. In the evidence accumulation model framework response
caution represents how much evidence an individual requires before
they make a response. An individual with a preference for speed is
assumed to set a lower boundary, such that they respond quickly but
risk making more errors due to noise in the decision processes. In some
studies, such individuals have been referred to as having “impulsive
information processing” (Metin et al., 2013). In contrast, a cautious
individual waits for more information before responding to ensure ac-
curacy at the expense of reaction time, corresponding to a higher
boundary.
The individual's preference for speed vs. accuracy is mathematically
independent of the individual's ability to extract information and prime
the desired response (while inhibiting or controlling unwanted in-
formation or response tendencies). This ability is represented by the
rate that correct evidence accumulates towards the boundary, rather
than the height of the boundary. In the drift-diffusion model (Ratcliff,
1978; Fig. 1A), the underlying rate of evidence accumulation (the drift
rate) is assumed to be linear, though subject to moment-to-moment
noise. Extensions of the diffusion model, such as the diffusion model for
conflict tasks (Ulrich, Schroter, Leuthold, & Birngruber, 2015; Fig. 1B),
assume that the information extracted from a stimulus can vary over
time as a function of both automatic and controlled processes. This
captures the assumption that prepotent response features (e.g., incon-
gruent arrows in a flanker task) initially capture attention but that their
influence decreases or is inhibited over time. But in either case, re-
sponse caution (i.e., the boundary) is a separate parameter from these
processes.
The quantitative dissociation of response caution from information
processing efficiency (drift rate) has led to valuable insights into cog-
nitive and behavioural changes in fields such as aging (Ratcliff, Thapar,
& McKoon, 2006, 2010), as well as neuropsychological conditions such
as autistic spectrum disorder and attention-deficit hyperactivity dis-
order (Karalunas et al., 2018; Pirrone, Dickinson, Gomez, Stafford, &
Milne, 2017; Pirrone, Johnson, Stafford, & Milne, 2020; Powell et al.,
2019). In most cases (though not all), older adults and individuals with
autism show higher levels of response caution relative to young adults
and healthy controls respectively. Interestingly, separate studies have
shown higher levels of risk aversion in older adults when using self-
report measures (the Domain-Specific Risk-Taking scale; Rolison,
Hanoch, Wood, & Liu, 2014) and behavioural gambling tasks (Rutledge
et al., 2016). Similarly, there is evidence that individuals with autism
adopt more risk-averse strategies in gambling tasks (Gosling & Moutier,
2018; South et al., 2014). This co-occurrence of increased response
caution in choice reaction time tasks and increased risk aversion in
other domains hints at a possible underlying link related to the concept
of impulsivity.
We have routinely included the UPPS-P questionnaire in our recent
experiments, following completion of the behavioural tasks, with the
overarching goal of examining whether using a cognitive model to
dissociate caution from other cognitive mechanisms can reveal a
Fig. 1. Schematic of two evidence accumulation models. A. In the drift diffusion model (Ratcliff, 1978), the decision on each trial (jagged lines) is represented by the
noisy accumulation of evidence to a boundary. The solid black line represents the average rate of evidence accumulation or ‘drift rate’. The upper and lower boundary
represent the correct and incorrect response respectively. An individual who sets a low boundary (red lines) waits for less evidence before responding and is more
likely to make an error due to noise in the accumulation process. B: In the diffusion model for conflict tasks (Ulrich et al., 2015), the average rate of evidence
accumulation is a composite of both controlled processing and automatic activation. The automatic activation function captures the assumption that prepotent
response features (e.g., incongruent flankers) are processed via a fast, automatic route (Ridderinkhof, 2002). The solid black line shows the underlying accumulation
for an incongruent trial, where automatic activation elicited from (e.g.) flankers in the flanker task contributes to the incorrect response tendency in the early part of
the decision phase. See Supplementary material A for more information. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to
the web version of this article.)
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relationship with impulsivity that was previously hidden. Here, we
present a meta-analysis of the evidence we have accumulated over
these studies (for a discussion of this approach, see Goh, Hall, &
Rosenthal, 2016). We focus on response caution for the theoretical
reasons above, and also because we have recently observed that this
parameter correlated strongly across conflict tasks (average
rho = 0.54), whereas the parameters associated with conflict and in-
hibition did not (rho = 0.04; Hedge, Powell, Bompas, & Sumner, 2020).
We reasoned that if we do not see correlations with a parameter that is
both theoretically aligned to impulsivity and that correlates well across
tasks, then we are unlikely to see correlations with other sub-facets of
cognition (Wennerhold & Friese, 2020). We examine all of the UPPS-P
subscales in our analysis, though there is arguably most conceptual
overlap between response caution and the items in the lack of pre-
meditation and perseverance subscales, which refer to planning and at-
tentiveness. Both these dimensions and negative urgency have also pre-
viously shown weak (r = 0.1) but significant correlations with
traditional measures of response inhibition (Cyders & Coskunpinar,
2011), though these studies did not dissociate response caution from
ability as we do here.
2. Method
2.1. Datasets
We conducted a new analysis of published data. These studies and
their basic details are given in Table 1. We have previously reported the
behavioural results and model parameters to examine whether the tasks
themselves correlate with each other, but we have not previously re-
ported the correlations between cognitive response caution (or the
other model parameters) and the UPPS-P subscales that are the focus of
our analysis here.
We adopt a meta-analytic approach to maximise the power of these
data to detect a meaningful correlation between caution and the UPPS-
P subscales, should one exist. To assess this, we conducted a sensitivity
power analysis for a random effects meta-analysis under varying as-
sumptions of heterogeneity in the effect sizes (Griffin, 2020; Pigott,
2012). Based on 19 effect sizes and an average sample size of 68, we
have 80% power to detect correlations equal to or greater than
rho = 0.09, 0.11, and 0.16 assuming small, moderate, and large levels
of heterogeneity respectively (α = 0.05, two-tailed).
2.2. Behavioural tasks
Fig. 2 shows a schematic of the choice reaction time tasks used. In
all tasks, participants were required to decide which of two (four in the
Stroop) alternatives to categorise a stimulus. In the flanker task parti-
cipants must respond to the direction of the central arrow and ignore
the flanking stimuli. In the Stroop task participants must respond to the
colour of the font and ignore the written word. In the Simon task par-
ticipants must respond to the colour of the circle and ignore its location.
In the dot motion task participants must respond to the direction of
coherent motion in an array of dots. The Simon task in Dataset 3 did not
include a neutral condition. All the tasks are commonly used to measure
response inhibition except the dot motion task in Dataset 5, which is
commonly used in both human and animal studies of decision making
(c.f. Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008). Datasets 4 and 5 included a speed-ac-
curacy trade-off manipulation, in which participants were instructed to
prioritise speed, accuracy or both equally in separate blocks. In all other
datasets, participants were instructed to be both as fast and as accurate
as possible.
For our current purposes, the critical similarity between these tasks
is that they all allow us to measure the level of caution with which
individuals approach speeded decision making. We have previously
observed moderate to strong between-task correlations in the response
caution parameter (Hedge et al., 2019; Hedge, Powell, et al., 2020).
Therefore, we interpret response caution to be a (at least in part) gen-
eral process or set of processes. Here, where we are interested in the
relationship between response caution and impulsivity, we treat the
correlations from each task as an estimate of this same relationship.
2.3. UPPS-P impulsive behaviour scale
The UPPS-P is a 59-item questionnaire that measures five compo-
nents of impulsivity: negative urgency, premeditation, perseverance,
sensation seeking, and positive urgency (Lynam et al., 2006; Whiteside
& Lynam, 2001). Participants rate their agreement with each item on a
four-point Likert-type scale, ranging from Agree strongly (1) to Disagree
Strongly (4). The subscales have shown high internal consistencies
(> 0.81; Whiteside & Lynam, 2001), and good to excellent three-week
test-retest reliabilities for the subscales in this population (ICCs from
0.70 to 0.91; Hedge, Powell, & Sumner, 2018b). In our test-retest re-
liability studies (Datasets 2 and 4), participants completed the UPPS-P
in both sessions. We average the subscale values across sessions for our
correlations here.
2.4. Model fitting
For the conflict tasks in Datasets 1–5, we fit the diffusion model for
conflict tasks (Ulrich et al., 2015) using Matlab. For the dot motion task
in Dataset 5, we fit the standard drift-diffusion model using the DMAT
toolbox in Matlab (Vandekerckhove & Tuerlinckx, 2008). We describe
both models and their parameters in detail in Supplementary material
A. Both models produce a boundary separation parameter which we
interpret as response caution (see Fig. 1). The “number of correlations”
column in Table 1 corresponds to the number of boundary separation
Table 1
Details of datasets included in meta-analysis. See Source publications for detailed information. The number of correlations is dependent on the number
of boundary separation parameters estimated from the dataset (at least one per task). See Fig. 2 for a schematic of the tasks.
Dataset Source N Tasks Conditions Trials per condition Number of correlations
1 Hedge, Powell, et al. (2020) 50 Flanker 3 336 1
Simon 3 336 1
2 Hedge et al. (2018b) 103 Flanker 3 480 1
Stroop 3 480 1
3 Hedge, Powell, Bompas, et al. (2018) 102 Simon (blocked trials) 2 288 2a
Simon (intermixed trials) 2 288 1
4 Hedge et al. (2019; Exp. 1) 43 Flanker 9 576 3b
Stroop 9 576 3b
5 Hedge et al. (2019; Exp. 2) 69 Flanker 9 192 3b
Dot motion 6 240 3b
Note. The data were collapsed across two separate testing sessions in Datasets 2 (three weeks apart) and 4 (four weeks apart).
a The blocked version of the task includes a separate boundary estimate for congruent and incongruent trials.
b Datasets include separate boundary estimates for blocks in which instructions emphasise either speed, accuracy, or both speed and accuracy.
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parameters estimated from each task. For tasks with no instruction
manipulation and where congruent, neutral and incongruent trials are
randomly intermixed within blocks (Datasets 1 and 2), we obtained one
boundary parameter per task. In the “blocked trials” variant of the
Simon task in Dataset 3, we obtained separate estimates for congruent
and incongruent trials. For the speed-accuracy trade-off experiments in
Datasets 4 and 5, we obtained separate estimates for blocks where
speed, accuracy, and both speed and accuracy were emphasised.
The details of our model fitting can be seen in Hedge, Powell, et al.
(2020) for Datasets 1 to 4, and Hedge et al. (2019) for Dataset 5. Briefly,
parameters are estimated by comparing reaction times for correct and
error responses to data simulated from the model. We use optimisation
algorithms to find the set of parameters that minimises the discrepancy
between the observed and simulated data. Each participant and task are
fit independently. We collapsed Datasets 2 and 4 across testing sessions
for the purposes of model fitting. For the diffusion model for conflict
tasks we adopted a common approach (c.f. White, Servant, & Logan,
2017) wherein we created six bins based on quantiles of the observed
reaction times ([0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9]), and counted the number of
trials in each bin. We did this separately for correct and error responses,
and separately for each condition. When participants made fewer than
eleven errors in that condition, error reaction times were instead
grouped into three bins ([0.3, 0.5, 0.7]). When fewer than five errors
were made, we fit the median reaction time. We initially simulated data
from the model using 5000 sets of randomly generated parameters and
compared the deviance (−2 log-likelihood) between the observed data
and each of our simulated datasets. We then submitted the best 15
parameter sets to a Nelder-Mead simplex (Nelder & Mead, 1965) based
algorithm in Matlab, which we restarted 3 times to avoid local minima.
The correlations we entered into our meta-analysis are with the best
fitting parameters for each participant and task derived from this pro-
cess. A similar approach is implemented in DMAT (Vandekerckhove &
Tuerlinckx, 2008), which we used to fit the standard drift diffusion
model to the dot-motion task (Dataset 5).
We examined the four-week test-retest reliability for the conflict
diffusion model for the speed-accuracy trade-off tasks in Dataset 4
(Hedge et al., 2019). For boundary separation, these ranged from poor
(ICC = 0.39) to good (ICC = 0.71). These values fall within the range
observed elsewhere in the literature with the standard drift-diffusion
model across a variety of tasks (Enkavi et al., 2019; Lerche & Voss,
2017; Schubert, Frischkorn, Hagemann, & Voss, 2016). To our knowl-
edge, there is currently no evidence as to whether there are systematic
differences in the reliability of parameters derived from different tasks
or administration methods. For our current purposes, these findings
suggest that there is some stability in individuals' levels of response
caution.
2.5. Meta-analysis of caution with impulsivity
For each dataset, we calculated Spearman's rho correlations
Fig. 2. Schematic of the choice reaction time tasks used in all datasets. In the flanker task participants identify the central arrow as pointing to either the left or the
right. In the Stroop task participants identified the font colour as red, blue, green or yellow. In the Simon task participants identified the circle as either blue or green.
In the dot-motion task, participants identified whether the direction of coherent motion in an array of dots was to the left or right. Trials were separated by an
interstimulus interval of 750 ms except in the dot motion task where the interstimulus interval was 500 ms. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this
figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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between each boundary separation estimate and each UPPS-P subscale.
For example, in Dataset 1 we computed correlations between the UPPS-
P and both boundary separation in the flanker task and boundary se-
paration in the Simon task. This produced 19 correlations in total across
the datasets. These correlations were then meta-analysed using a mul-
tilevel random effects meta-analysis, implemented in the metafor
package in R (R Core Development Team, 2017; Viechtbauer, 2010).
We fit a three-level random effects model, which allows us to account
for non-independence of correlations taken from the same dataset. At
the first level, we assume that there is variance in the effect size esti-
mates due to sampling error. At the second level, we assume that there
is variance in the effect sizes that we are trying to estimate within each
dataset. As we take multiple correlations from the same dataset, we
refer to these as being nested within datasets. At the third level, we
assume variance across datasets. To assess heterogeneity, we examined
the I2 statistic, which represents the percentage of total variance attri-
butable to between- and within-dataset variance relative to sampling
variance (Viechtbauer, 2019).
We report the individual correlations, and the results for other
parameters, in Supplementary material B. The data and analysis code
are available from the Open Science Framework (https://osf.io/w8va9/
).
3. Results
High scores on the UPPS-P subscales are indicative of higher im-
pulsivity, whereas lower values of boundary separation are associated
with lower caution. Therefore, if there were a consistent link between
impulsivity and caution, we would expect correlations to be con-
sistently negative. Fig. 3 plots the main results from our meta-analysis.
For every UPPS-P subscale, the 95% confidence intervals included zero;
we therefore observed no evidence that cognitive response caution was
associated with impulsivity. Average correlations ranged from
rho = −0.04 to rho = −0.02 and were consistently low across both
subscales and datasets. The 95% confidence intervals for our estimates
contain the values of rho that we cannot reject based on our data, the
largest (absolute) value of which was observed for the premeditation
subscale; rho = −0.04, 95% CI [−0.13, 0.05]. In other words, the
largest correlation that our data are consistent with is rho = −0.13,
and we can reject the hypothesis of a substantial relationship between
response caution and any dimension of self-reported impulsivity. The
highest total I2 value for any UPPS-P subscale was 30.7%, which is
typically interpreted as a low level of heterogeneity (Higgins,
Thompson, Deeks, & Altman, 2003) and was not statistically significant
(Cochrane's Q = 23.54, p = .17). In all cases, this was primarily at-
tributed to variance between datasets rather than within (see Supple-
mentary material B for more details).
4. Discussion
Despite conceptual overlap and common terminology, we find no
evidence that response caution (or impulsive information processing),
as defined by cognitive decision models, is associated with any di-
mension of impulsivity, as defined by the UPPS-P. It seems that a
cautious-impulsive dimension to the way that individuals approach
choice reaction time tasks is orthogonal to the propensity for rash ac-
tion captured by UPPS-P questions.
We extend previous research by attempting to isolate the aspect of
cognitive task performance most likely to correlate with self-report
impulsivity. Nevertheless, our findings are consistent with several stu-
dies and meta-analyses that have shown that self-report measures of
impulsivity show weak or no correlation with behavioural tasks
(Creswell et al., 2019; Cyders & Coskunpinar, 2011, 2012; Eisenberg
et al., 2019; Saunders, Milyavskaya, Etz, Randles, & Inzlicht, 2018;
Schluter, Kim, & Hodgins, 2018; Sharma et al., 2014). Theorists have
previously noted the “jingle” problem in impulsivity research (Block,
1995; Sharma, Kohl, Morgan, & Clark, 2013); a common terminology
has arisen to describe what may be different underlying constructs.
Though it is intuitive to refer to individuals on the low end of the re-
sponse caution dimension as ‘impulsive’ responders, our results indicate
it captures something different from the sub-facets of impulsivity that
are captured by the UPPS-P.
Fig. 3. Meta-analytic (black diamonds) and observed (circles) correlations between boundary separation/response caution and the UPPS-P impulsivity questionnaire
subscales. Error bars and brackets show 95% confidence intervals. A multi-level random effects meta-analysis was performed on Spearman's rho correlations
calculated for each pair of tasks, allowing for clustering where multiple correlations were taken from the same dataset. Note that all the 95% confidence intervals
include zero.
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The absence of a correlation with self-report does not mean the
construct of response caution is not useful. There is evidence that re-
sponse caution is sensitive to factors such as aging (e.g., Ratcliff et al.,
2006; Ratcliff, Thapar, Gomez, & McKoon, 2004), and that it correlates
across conflict tasks (Eisenberg et al., 2019;Hedge et al., 2019; Hedge,
Powell, et al., 2020). To our knowledge, only one study has examined
the relationship between response caution and real-world behaviours
associated with self-control (e.g., self-reported drug use, obesity;
Eisenberg et al., 2019). They found that factors derived from beha-
vioural tasks, including response caution, showed poor predictive value
relative to questionnaire methods (see also Creswell et al., 2019). Other
studies have concluded that both behavioural and self-report measures
have independent predictive value for real world outcomes (Sharma
et al., 2014). Future efforts to resolve these inconsistencies may benefit
from the dissociating response caution from other processes of potential
interest in commonly used tasks, such as conflict control and processing
speed (Hedge, Powell, et al., 2020). However, while we may gain a
better understanding of these tasks through the application of cognitive
models, this will not automatically lead us to better real-world pre-
diction (for a discussion, see Hedge, Bompas, & Sumner, 2020).
Though our analysis was not exhaustive given the range of im-
pulsivity measures used in the literature (Sharma et al., 2014), we ex-
pect our findings are not specific to the UPPS-P. The UPPS-P was de-
signed to capture factors identified in existing impulsivity
questionnaires (Whiteside & Lynam, 2001), and meta-analyses have
shown that the UPPS-P and other questionnaires reflect common un-
derlying traits (Sharma et al., 2014). With regard to behavioural tasks,
as we have noted, response caution parameters correlate across conflict
tasks, both in our data and in a larger battery of tasks (Eisenberg et al.,
2019; Hedge, Powell, et al., 2020). We therefore have no reason to
expect that response caution would correlate with self-report had we
used different tasks, at least when considering spontaneous strategies in
a healthy population. Cyders and Coskunpinar (2012) observed small
but significant correlations with self-report measures and behavioural
measures taken from “prepotent response inhibition” tasks (including
the stop-signal, antisaccade, and continuous performance tasks),
though variance in these measures may also reflect multiple underlying
sources. For example, a recent model-based analysis of the stop-signal
task suggests that correlations with self-reported impulsivity may re-
flect attentional lapses rather than inhibition (Skippen et al., 2019).
If people's disposition to make decisions quickly at the expense of
errors is not driven by impulsivity, as commonly understood, then what
does it reflect? It is possible that response caution is a behavioural
“snap shot” (Cyders & Coskunpinar, 2012), and captures something
different to individuals' self-perceived caution in everyday life. How-
ever, it appears that individuals are consistent in how they strategically
approach similar tasks, given the between-task and reliability correla-
tions we have previously observed (Hedge et al., 2019; Hedge, Powell,
et al., 2020). We assume that individuals have some control over their
level of caution - if we instruct participants to respond more quickly,
they are able to do so, and this is captured in part by lowering their
boundary (though other parameters can also change; Rae, Heathcote,
Donkin, Averell, & Brown, 2014). We instructed participants to be both
fast and accurate in our studies, except for the additional speed- and
accuracy-emphasis blocks in Datasets 4 and 5, and we asked whether
their default strategy might reflect trait impulsivity. There is evidence
that individuals typically favour accuracy over speed by default
(Forstmann et al., 2008), though we know little about why they spon-
taneously adopt the levels of caution that they do. Notably, while evi-
dence accumulation models mathematically dissociate caution from
parameters that represent processing ability, they may be correlated in
real data (Schmiedek et al., 2007). Individuals who have higher levels
of ability (higher drift rates) can achieve the same level of accuracy as
individuals with lower ability (lower drift rates) while setting a lower
boundary. Advancing our understanding of the mechanisms underlying
response caution may benefit from examining why individuals adopt
sub-optimal strategies for their level of ability, or by incentivising
participants to favour speed or accuracy (e.g., to optimise a reward;
Starns & Ratcliff, 2010), rather than looking at what they do sponta-
neously.
In conclusion, we show that individuals with a tendency to respond
quickly while risking errors do not self-report higher levels of im-
pulsivity. These findings inform the interpretation of individual differ-
ences in response caution in domains such as aging (Ratcliff et al.,
2006) and neuropsychological conditions (Metin et al., 2013; Powell
et al., 2019). They are also a further illustration that the relationship
between lab-based and self-report measures of impulsivity is not
straightforward (Cyders & Coskunpinar, 2012; Sharma et al., 2014;
Wennerhold & Friese, 2020).
CRediT authorship contribution statement
Craig Hedge:Conceptualization, Methodology, Formal analysis,
Writing - original draft, Visualization, Investigation.Georgina
Powell:Conceptualization, Writing - review & editing.Aline
Bompas:Conceptualization, Writing - review & editing.Petroc
Sumner:Conceptualization, Writing - review & editing, Funding
acquisition, Supervision.
Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at https://
doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2020.110257.
References
Block, J. (1995). A contrarian view of the five-factor approach to personality description.
Psychological Bulletin, 117(2), 187–215. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.117.2.
187.
Chambers, C. D., Garavan, H., & Bellgrove, M. A. (2009). Insights into the neural basis of
response inhibition from cognitive and clinical neuroscience. Neuroscience and
Biobehavioral Reviews, 33, 631–646. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2008.08.
016.
Creswell, K. G., Wright, A. G. C., Flory, J. D., Skrzynski, C. J., & Manuck, S. B. (2019).
Multidimensional assessment of impulsivity-related measures in relation to ex-
ternalizing behaviors. Psychological Medicine. https://doi.org/10.1017/
S0033291718002295.
Cyders, M. A., & Coskunpinar, A. (2011). Measurement of constructs using self-report and
behavioral lab tasks: Is there overlap in nomothetic span and construct representation
for impulsivity? Clinical Psychology Review, 31, 965–982. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
cpr.2011.06.001.
Cyders, M. A., & Coskunpinar, A. (2012). The relationship between self-report and lab
task conceptualizations of impulsivity. Journal of Research in Personality, 46(1),
121–124. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2011.11.005.
Donders, F. C. (1969). On the speed of mental processes. Acta Psychologica, 30, 412–431.
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/5811531.
Donkin, C., Brown, S., Heathcote, A., & Wagenmakers, E. J. (2011). Diffusion versus
linear ballistic accumulation: Different models but the same conclusions about psy-
chological processes? Psychonomic Bulletin and Review, 18, 61–69. https://doi.org/10.
3758/s13423-010-0022-4.
Draheim, C., Mashburn, C. A., Martin, J. D., & Engle, R. W. (2019). Reaction time in
differential and developmental research: A review and commentary on the problems
and alternatives. Psychological Bulletin, 145(5), 508–535. https://doi.org/10.1037/
bul0000192.
Eisenberg, I. W., Bissett, P. G., Zeynep Enkavi, A., Li, J., MacKinnon, D. P., Marsch, L. A.,
& Poldrack, R. A. (2019). Uncovering the structure of self-regulation through data-
driven ontology discovery. Nature Communications, 10(1), 2319. https://doi.org/10.
1038/s41467-019-10301-1.
Enkavi, A. Z., Eisenberg, I. W., Bissett, P. G., Mazza, G. L., MacKinnon, D. P., Marsch, L.
A., & Poldrack, R. A. (2019). Large-scale analysis of test–retest reliabilities of self-
regulation measures. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 116(12),
5472–5477. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1818430116.
Evans, N. J., Rae, B., Bushmakin, M., Rubin, M., & Brown, S. D. (2017). Need for closure is
associated with urgency in perceptual decision-making. Memory and Cognition, 45(7),
1193–1205. https://doi.org/10.3758/s13421-017-0718-z.
Eysenck, H. J., & Eysenck, M. W. (1985). Personality and individual differences: A natural
science approach. Plenum.
Forstmann, B. U., Dutilh, G., Brown, S., Neumann, J., von Cramon, D. Y., Ridderinkhof, K.
R., & Wagenmaker, E. J. (2008). Striatum and pre-SMA facilitate decision-making
under time pressure. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United
States of America, 105, 17538–17542. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0805903105.
Forstmann, B. U., Ratcliff, R., & Wagenmakers, E. J. (2016). Sequential sampling models
C. Hedge, et al. Personality and Individual Differences 167 (2020) 110257
6
in cognitive neuroscience: Advantages, applications, and extensions. Annual Review of
Psychology, 67(67), 641–666. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-122414-
033645.
Friedman, N. P., & Miyake, A. (2004). The relations among inhibition and interference
control functions: A latent-variable analysis. Journal of Experimental Psychology:
General, 133(1), 101–135. https://doi.org/10.1037/0096-3445.133.1.101.
Goh, J. X., Hall, J. A., & Rosenthal, R. (2016). Mini meta-analysis of your own studies:
Some arguments on why and a primer on how. Social and Personality Psychology
Compass, 10(10), 535–549. https://doi.org/10.1111/spc3.12267.
Gosling, C. J., & Moutier, S. (2018). Brief report: Risk-aversion and rationality in autism
spectrum disorders. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 48(10),
3623–3628. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10803-018-3616-8.
Griffin, J. W. (2020). metapoweR: An R package for computing meta-analytic statistical
power. R package version 0.1.0. https://github.com/jasonwgriffin/metapower.
Hedge, C., Bompas, A., & Sumner, P. (2020). Task reliability considerations in compu-
tational psychiatry. Biological Psychiatry: Cognitive Neuroscience and Neuroimaging.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bpsc.2020.05.004.
Hedge, C., Powell, G., Bompas, A., & Sumner, P. (2020). Strategy and processing speed
eclipse individual differences in control ability in conflict tasks. PsyArXiv Preprints.
https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/vgpxq.
Hedge, C., Powell, G., Bompas, A., Vivian-Griffiths, S., & Sumner, P. (2018). Low and
variable correlation between reaction time costs and accuracy costs explained by
accumulation models: Meta-analysis and simulations. Psychological Bulletin, 144(11),
1200–1227. https://doi.org/10.1037/bul0000164.
Hedge, C., Powell, G., & Sumner, P. (2018a). The mapping between transformed reaction
time costs and models of processing in aging and cognition. Psychology and Aging,
33(7), 1093–1104. https://doi.org/10.1037/pag0000298.
Hedge, C., Powell, G., & Sumner, P. (2018b). The reliability paradox: Why robust cog-
nitive tasks do not produce reliable individual differences. Behavior Research Methods,
50(3), 1166–1186. https://doi.org/10.3758/s13428-017-0935-1.
Hedge, C., Vivian-Griffiths, S., Powell, G., Bompas, A., & Sumner, P. (2019). Slow and
steady? Strategic adjustments in response caution are moderately reliable and cor-
relate across tasks. Consciousness and Cognition, 75. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
concog.2019.102797.
Higgins, J. P. T., Thompson, S. G., Deeks, J. J., & Altman, D. G. (2003). Measuring in-
consistency in meta-analyses. British Medical Journal, 327, 557–560. https://doi.org/
10.1136/bmj.327.7414.557.
Karalunas, S. L., Hawkey, E., Gustafsson, H., Miller, M., Langhorst, M., Cordova, M., ...
Nigg, J. T. (2018). Overlapping and distinct cognitive impairments in attention-
deficit/hyperactivity and autism spectrum disorder without intellectual disability.
Journal of Abnormal Child Psychology, 46, 1705–1716. https://doi.org/10.1007/
s10802-017-0394-2.
Lerche, V., & Voss, A. (2017). Retest reliability of the parameters of the Ratcliff diffusion
model. Psychological Research, 81, 629–652. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00426-016-
0770-5.
Lynam, D. R., Smith, G. T., Whiteside, S. P., & Cyders, M. A. (2006). The UPPS-P: Assessing
five personality pathways to impulsive behavior. (Unpublished technical report).
Metin, B., Roeyers, H., Wiersema, J. R., van der Meere, J. J., Thompson, M., & Sonuga-
Barke, E. (2013). ADHD performance reflects inefficient but not impulsive informa-
tion processing: A diffusion model analysis. Neuropsychology, 27, 193–200. https://
doi.org/10.1037/a0031533.
Nelder, J. A., & Mead, R. (1965). A simplex-method for function minimization. Computer
Journal, 7, 308–313.
Pigott, T. D. (2012). Advances in meta-analysis. Advances in meta-analysisSpringerhttps://
doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-2278-5.
Pirrone, A., Dickinson, A., Gomez, R., Stafford, T., & Milne, E. (2017). Understanding
perceptual judgment in autism spectrum disorder using the drift diffusion model.
Neuropsychology, 31(2), 173–180. https://doi.org/10.1037/neu0000320.
Pirrone, A., Johnson, I., Stafford, T., & Milne, E. (2020). A diffusion model decomposition
of orientation discrimination in children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD).
European Journal of Developmental Psychology, 17(2), 213–230. https://doi.org/10.
1080/17405629.2018.1561364.
Powell, G., Jones, C. R. G., Hedge, C., Charman, T., Happé, F., Simonoff, E., & Sumner, P.
(2019). Face processing in autism spectrum disorder re-evaluated through diffusion
models. Neuropsychology, 33(4), 445–461. https://doi.org/10.1037/neu0000524.
R Core Development Team (2017). R: A language and environment for statistical computing.
R Foundation for Statistical Computing.
Rae, B., Heathcote, A., Donkin, C., Averell, L., & Brown, S. (2014). The hare and the
tortoise: Emphasizing speed can change the evidence used to make decisions. Journal
of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 40(5), 1226–1243.
https://doi.org/10.1037/a0036801.
Ratcliff, R. (1978). A theory of memory retrieval. Psychological Review, 85.
Ratcliff, R., & McKoon, G. (2008). The diffusion decision model: Theory and data for two-
choice decision tasks. Neural Computation, 20(4), 873–922. https://doi.org/10.1162/
neco.2008.12-06-420.
Ratcliff, R., & Smith, P. L. (2004). A comparison of sequential sampling models for two-
choice reaction time. Psychological Review, 111, 333–367. https://doi.org/10.1037/
0033-295X.111.2.333.
Ratcliff, R., Thapar, A., Gomez, P., & McKoon, G. (2004). A diffusion model analysis of the
effects of aging in the lexical-decision task. Psychology and Aging, 19, 278–289.
https://doi.org/10.1037/0882-7974.19.2.278.
Ratcliff, R., Thapar, A., & McKoon, G. (2006). Aging and individual differences in rapid
two-choice decisions. Psychonomic Bulletin and Review, 13, 626–635. https://doi.org/
10.3758/Bf03193973.
Ratcliff, R., Thapar, A., & McKoon, G. (2010). Individual differences, aging, and IQ in
two-choice tasks. Cognitive Psychology. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cogpsych.2009.09.
001.
Rey-Mermet, A., Gade, M., & Oberauer, K. (2018). Should we stop thinking about in-
hibition? Searching for individual and age differences in inhibition ability. Journal of
Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 44(4), 501–526. https://
doi.org/10.1037/xlm0000450.
Ridderinkhof, K. R. (2002). Micro- and macro-adjustments of task set: Activation and
suppression in conflict tasks. Psychological Research, 66, 312–323. https://doi.org/10.
1007/s00426-002-0104-7.
Rolison, J. J., Hanoch, Y., Wood, S., & Liu, P. J. (2014). Risk-taking differences across the
adult life span: A question of age and domain. The Journals of Gerontology. Series B,
Psychological Sciences and Social Sciences, 69(6), 870–880. https://doi.org/10.1093/
geronb/gbt081.
Rutledge, R. B., Smittenaar, P., Zeidman, P., Brown, H. R., Adams, R. A., Lindenberger, U.,
... Dolan, R. J. (2016). Risk taking for potential reward decreases across the lifespan.
Current Biology, 26(12), 1634–1639. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2016.05.017.
Saunders, B., Milyavskaya, M., Etz, A., Randles, D., & Inzlicht, M. (2018). Reported self-
control is not meaningfully associated with inhibition-related executive function: A
Bayesian analysis. Collabra: Psychology, 4(1), https://doi.org/10.1525/collabra.134.
Schluter, M. G., Kim, H. S., & Hodgins, D. C. (2018). Obtaining quality data using be-
havioral measures of impulsivity in gambling research with Amazon’s Mechanical
Turk. Journal of Behavioral Addictions, 7(4), 1122–1131. https://doi.org/10.1556/
2006.7.2018.117.
Schmiedek, F., Oberauer, K., Wilhelm, O., Süss, H.-M., Wittmann, W. W., Suss, H. M., &
Wittmann, W. W. (2007). Individual differences in components of reaction time
distributions and their relations to working memory and intelligence. Journal of
Experimental Psychology: General, 136(3), 414–429. https://doi.org/10.1037/0096-
3445.136.3.414.
Schubert, A.-L., Frischkorn, G., Hagemann, D., & Voss, A. (2016). Trait characteristics of
diffusion model parameters. Journal of Intelligence, 4(3), 7. https://doi.org/10.3390/
jintelligence4030007.
Sharma, L., Kohl, K., Morgan, T. A., & Clark, L. A. (2013). “Impulsivity”: Relations be-
tween self-report and behavior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 104,
559–575. https://doi.org/10.1037/A0031181.
Sharma, L., Markon, K. E., & Clark, L. A. (2014). Toward a theory of distinct types of
“impulsive” behaviors: A meta-analysis of self-report and behavioral measures.
Psychological Bulletin, 140, 374–408. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0034418.
Skippen, P., Matzke, D., Heathcote, A., Fulham, W. R., Michie, P., & Karayanidis, F.
(2019). Reliability of triggering inhibitory process is a better predictor of impulsivity
than SSRT. Acta Psychologica, 192, 104–117. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.actpsy.2018.
10.016.
South, M., Chamberlain, P. D., Wigham, S., Newton, T., Le Couteur, A., McConachie, H.,
... Rodgers, J. (2014). Enhanced decision making and risk avoidance in high-func-
tioning autism spectrum disorder. Neuropsychology, 28(2), 222–228. https://doi.org/
10.1037/neu0000016.
Starns, J. J., & Ratcliff, R. (2010). The effects of aging on the speed-accuracy compromise:
Boundary optimality in the diffusion model. Psychology and Aging, 25, 377–390.
https://doi.org/10.1037/a0018022.
Stroop, J. R. (1935). Studies of interference in serial verbal reactions. Journal of
Experimental Psychology, 18, 643–662.
Ulrich, R., Schroter, H., Leuthold, H., & Birngruber, T. (2015). Automatic and controlled
stimulus processing in conflict tasks: Superimposed diffusion processes and delta
functions. Cognitive Psychology, 78, 148–174. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cogpsych.
2015.02.005.
Vandekerckhove, J., & Tuerlinckx, F. (2008). Diffusion model analysis with MATLAB: A
DMAT primer. Behavior Research Methods, 40, 61–72. https://doi.org/10.3758/Brm.
40.1.61.
Viechtbauer, W. (2010). Conducting meta-analyses in R with the metafor package.
Journal of Statistical Software, 36, 1–48.
Viechtbauer, W. (2019). I^2 for multilevel and multivariate models. Retrieved from:
http://www.metafor-project.org/doku.php/tips:i2_multilevel_multivariate.
Weafer, J., & de Wit, H. (2014). Sex differences in impulsive action and impulsive choice.
Addictive Behaviors, 39(11), 1573–1579. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.addbeh.2013.10.
033.
Wennerhold, L., & Friese, M. (2020). Why self-report measures of self-control and in-
hibition tasks do not substantially correlate. Collabra: Psychology, 6(1), https://doi.
org/10.1525/collabra.276.
White, C. N., Servant, M., & Logan, G. D. (2017). Testing the validity of conflict drift-
diffusion models for use in estimating cognitive processes: A parameter-recovery
study. Psychonomic Bulletin and Review. https://doi.org/10.3758/s13423-017-1271-2.
Whiteside, S. P., & Lynam, D. R. (2001). The five factor model and impulsivity: Using a
structural model of personality to understand impulsivity. Personality and Individual
Differences, 30(4), 669–689.
C. Hedge, et al. Personality and Individual Differences 167 (2020) 110257
7
